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1 ’One move’ eliminative seman-
tics
Veltman’s simple update system. The main features of the
system are given in the following citation.
Let W be the powerset of the set A of atomic
sentences. σ is an information state iff σ ⊆ W ; 0,
the minimal state, is the information state given by
W ; 1, the absurd state is the information state given
by the empty set;[...]
σ [p] = σ ∩ {w ∈W | p ∈ w}
σ [¬ϕ] = σ − σ [ϕ]
σ [ϕ ∧ ψ] = σ [ϕ] ∩ σ [ψ]
σ [ϕ ∨ ψ] = σ [ϕ] ∪ σ [ψ]
σ [might ϕ] = σif σ [ϕ] 6= 1
σ [might ϕ] = 1 if σ [ϕ] = 1
[...] If σ [ϕ] 6= 1, ϕ is acceptable in σ. If σ [ϕ] 6=
1, ϕ is not acceptable in σ and if σ [ϕ] = σ, ϕ is
accepted in σ. [...] sequence of sentences ϕ1; ...;ϕn
is consistent iff there is an information state σ such
that σ [ϕ1] ... [ϕn] 6= 1. [32] p.228.
1.1 Some remarks
In the dynamic semantical framework one is not supposed to
think of meaning only as a relation between a sentence and the
world (including possible ones). Rather meaning is conceived as
result of an interpretation process. In this case, interpretation
is understood as elimination process. In a metaphor, interpreter
entertains different candidate pictures of yet unknown situation,
sentences are picture fragments, and interpretation consists of
comparing picture fragments with candidate pictures and re-
moving the nonfitting ones. The number of remaining pictures
measure the amount of information, the more pictures remain
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the less information a text conveys. The residual pictures create
a context for the next step in interpretation process. The truth
value of a sentence may be unsettled at a particular stage if the
context contains both pictures having and pictures lacking the
fragment. Sentence being true in a context means that the con-
text is not empty and that the sentence does not have a power
to eliminate any picture from it.
One-move system. The simple update system is basically
a ’one move’ system with basic instruction σ [ϕ] = σ ∩ kϕkW ,
where kϕkW is a set of valuations v ∈ W verifying ϕ in the
standard sense.
Context dependent intension. A sentence gets its mean-
ing in the context created by other sentences. A context depen-
dent intension σ [ϕ] of sentence ϕ is the intersection of its context
free intension kϕkW and a context σ.
Semantic value. Sentences are state or context transitions.
Relative to a context σ a sentence ϕ may has one among four
semantic values. A sentence is either (α) accepted and accept-
able, or (β) not accepted and acceptable, or (γ) not accepted
and not acceptable, or (δ) accepted and not acceptable in a
given context.
V (ϕ,σ) =



α if σ [ϕ] = σ ∧ σ [ϕ] 6= 1
β if σ [ϕ] 6= σ ∧ σ [ϕ] 6= 1
γ if σ [ϕ] 6= σ ∧ σ [ϕ] = 1
δ if σ [ϕ] = σ ∧ σ [ϕ] = 1
Update paths. We call a sentence ϕ basic if its meaning is
defined only in terms of the basic intersective action (e.g. p∨q is
basic since σ [p ∨ q] = σ∩ kp ∨ qkW ). The meaning of a complex
sentence is defined in terms of executability of basic actions (e.g.
might p is complex sentence).
Define meaning potential of a sentence ϕ in the simple up-
date system dyn relative to the set of contexts Σ as a relation
kϕkΣdyn = {hσ,σ0i | σ [ϕ] = σ0}, where Σ = 2W .
3
transition type ⊆ kϕkΣdyn success basic test
α [ϕ]α =
½
hσ,σ0i ∈ Σ2 | V (ϕ,σ) = α∧
V (ϕ,σ0) = α
¾
+ + +
β [ϕ]α =
½
hσ,σ0i ∈ Σ2 | V (ϕ,σ) = β∧
V (ϕ,σ0) = α
¾
+ + -
γ [ϕ] δ =
½
hσ,σ0i ∈ Σ2 | V (ϕ,σ) = γ∧
V (ϕ,σ0) = δ
¾
- + -
δ [ϕ] δ =
½
hσ,σ0i ∈ Σ2 | V (ϕ,σ) = δ∧
V (ϕ,σ0) = δ
¾
- + +
Since the simple update system is eliminative, there are only
four transition types. If one is interested in meaning relations
rather then in modelling of cognitive dynamics, he may disre-
gard 12 remaining transition types. E.g. revision transition
type γ [ϕ]β requires some worlds to be restored.
Distinction between basic and test sentences is visible in
their transition types. Basic sentences allow of all four types,
while tests allow only of two. Tautology is identity relation:
k>kΣdyn = α [>]α∪ δ [>] δ =
©hσ,σ0i ∈ Σ2 | σ = σ0ª, while con-
tradiction is all-to-one relation: k⊥kΣdyn = γ [⊥] δ∪ δ [⊥] δ =©hσ,σ0i ∈ Σ2 | σ0 = δª.
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A comparison with Łukasiewicz’ three-valued sys-
tem. The eliminative semantics provides a simple solution
for the problem of unknown truth-value. In order to compare
eliminative system with Łukasiewicz’ three-valued system we
can connect dynamic values with static ones: dynamic value
α corresponds to 1, β to 12 , γ and δ ( i.e. value in a nonab-
surd state and value in the absurd state, respectively) corre-
spond to 0. Counterintuitive principle ♦ϕ ∧ ♦ψ ² ♦ (ϕ ∧ ψ)
is valid in Łukasiewicz’ logic, but it is not valid in the simple
update system. If both p and ¬p are epistemically possible,
then surely p ∧ ¬p is not epistemically possible. In Łukasiewicz
system, if V (p) = 12 and V (¬p) = 12 , then V (p ∧ ¬p) = 12 and
V (♦ (p ∧ ¬p)) = 1. In the simple update system, if V (p,σ) = β
andV (¬p,σ) = β, thenV (p ∧ ¬p,σ) = γ andV (♦ (p ∧ ¬p) ,σ) =
γ.
static
∧ 1 12 0
1 1 12 0
1
2
1
2
1
2 0
0 0 0 0
¬
1 0
1
2
1
2
0 1
♦
1 1
1
2 1
0 0
dynamic1
∧ α β γ δ
α α β γ ¥
β β ? γ ¥
γ γ γ γ ¥
δ ¥ ¥ ¥ δ
¬
α γ
β β
γ α
δ δ
might
α α
β α
γ γ
δ δ
1.2 Semantic notions
Consequence relations. No adding metaphor of valid conclu-
sion is explicated as no removal case. Within this framework one
can define different variants of no removal consequence, three
1 ’¥’ indicates that a particular combination of semantic values is not
possible. ’ ?’ indicates that value cannot be calculated for the general case;
in some cases β ∧ β = β and in others β ∧ β = γ.
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variants are discussed in [32] (reproduced here in a slightly mod-
ified notation and denoted by ²0−ut, ²ut, ²tt). It is important to
note that using dynamic semantics one can define other mean-
ing relations that resemble consequence relation, one of them is
added here, namely ²uu[5].
1. 0-update-to-test consequence: ϕ1; ...;ϕn ²0−ut ψ iff
0 [ϕ1] ... [ϕn] = 0 [ϕ1] ... [ϕn] [ψ]
2. Update-to-test consequence: ϕ1, ...,ϕn ²ut ψ iff
∀σ : σ [ϕ1] ... [ϕn] = σ [ϕ1] ... [ϕn] [ψ]
3. Test-to-test consequence: ϕ1; ...;ϕn ²tt ψ iff
∀σ : σ [ϕ1] = ... = σ [ϕn]→ σ [ϕ1] [ψ] = ... = σ [ϕn] [ψ]
4. Update-to-update consequence: ϕ1; ...;ϕn ²uu ψ
∀σ : σ [ϕ1] ... [ϕn] 6= 1→ σ [ϕ1] ... [ϕn] [ψ] 6= 1
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Some update paths for text p ∨ q;¬q; p. Sentence p ”adds
nothing” in the contexts created by preceding two sentences. If
the starting point is not 0, then some information has already
been accepted.
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First two notions of validity, ²0−utand ²ut may be useful
in the imperative logic for semantic phenomena that exhibit
order sensitivity and defeasibility. They do not have ”structural
properties” of classical consequence relation [5] [21](table below
shows some properties).
reflexivity permutation monotonicity
..., C, ... ² C
X,P1, P2, Y ² C
X,P2, P1, Y ² C
X,Y |= C
X,P, Y ² C
0-update-to-test - - -
Update-to-test - - only left
Test-to-test + + +
Given these weaker notions of validity, one may hope to
discover cases of ”weak inclusion” of meaning. Weak inclusion
may be lost by changing the order of sentences or by adding new
ones. Such a weaker notion of validity was implicitly present in
number of works on practical logic (e.g. [14], [19], [24], [33]).
Another semantic notion that will be used here (see 5.1 be-
low) is the notion of dynamic coherence of a text. It requires
existence of a nonabsurd state in which every sentence from the
text is accepted. Dynamic coherence corresponds to the static
notion of satisfiability. Dynamic consistency, on the other hand,
points to a transition path and it may be realized by an inco-
herent text.
Coherence. A sequence of sentences ϕ1; ...;ϕn is coherent [20]
iff ∃σ : σ 6= 1 ∧ σ [ϕ1] = ... = σ [ϕn].
Example 1 (Order sensitivity.) ”It might be raining...It is
not raining” is a consistent and incoherent text, reversing the
order gives an inconsistent text. ”It is impossible to open this
window...You should open this window” is an inconsistent text,
reversing the order gives consistent, yet incoherent text.
Example 2 (Defeasibility.) ”(i) Make people laugh! (ii) If
you tell that joke, you will make them laugh. So, (iii) maybe
you should tell the joke.” seems to be a valid argument. The
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conclusion is defeated by additional premises: ” (iv) If I tell
that joke, I will ruin my wife’s good mood. (v) Let it be the case
that my wife’s good mood is sustained!”
The last example can be analyzed in the framework of Geach’s
characterization of defeasibility of practical inference..
But even if a conclusion is validly drawn from the
acceptable premises, we are not obliged to accept it
if those premises are incomplete... (Geach [19] p.
77.)
If we follow his line of thought throughout the Example 2,
then a person who accepts (i) and (ii) and who thinks that (iii)
is their consequence nevertheless is ”not obliged to accept” (iii)
if he considers ”the premises to be incomplete” since (iv) and
(v) are missing.
Example 3 (Nonreflexivity) ”Make people laugh! If you tell
that joke, you will make them laugh. Maybe you should tell the
joke... If you tell that joke, you will ruin your wife’s good mood.
Sustain wife´s good mood! So, maybe you should tell the
joke.” does not seem to be a valid argument.
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2 Simple update system for imper-
atives
Moods and modal elements.
Imagine a picture representing a boxer in a par-
ticular stance. Now, this picture can be used to tell
someone how he should stand, should hold himself;
or how a particular man did stand in such-and-such
situation; and so on. One might (using the language
of chemistry) call that picture a proposition-radical.
[35] §23.
Speaking in terms of the picture-metaphor: the picture, or
rather - picture fragment means something, but its meaning
is unsaturated until it has been used in a certain way. The
active part, use is modal element1 of the sentence, the passive
its sentence-radical. Mϕ is a ”saturated expression” having
sentence-radical ϕ and modal element M . The sentence-radical
may be used for different semantic actions, and the way of its
use is determined by the modal element of sentence.
The dynamic semantics provides a natural way of thinking
about meaning of natural language sentences: different types of
semantic actions correspond to different moods. The number
of conceivable types of semantic actions exceeds the number of
natural language moods. Still the standard threefold division
into indicatives, imperatives and interrogatives may (and per-
haps should) be sustained. There are two obvious ways to do
so. First, one may divide the class of generated states in such a
1This terminology is used in [30], but not in the identical sense. While
Stenius takes modal element in the sense of mood indicator, here sentence
moods are taken to be a category of modal elements.
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Figure 1 Modal element, sentence radical and semantic action.
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way to define a characteristic property for each mood2. Second,
one may define sentence mood in terms of inter-mood and intra-
mood meaning relations between sentences having contradictory
sentence radicals3.
Two galleries metaphor. It seems that we can apply
eliminative semantics approach in imperative logic, mutatis mu-
tandis. Let us start with the metaphor of two galleries, one con-
taining, as already stated, alternative pictures of yet unknown
actual situation, the other gallery containing pictures of yet un-
known ought-to-be situation. When both galleries contain all
alternative pictures, then no information has flown in. If all the
pictures are visible in upper, ought-to-be or goal gallery then
there is nothing that should be done. If there is a strong dis-
crepancy in the content of the galleries (i.e. when they have no
common element), the system should change the actual situa-
tion.
Four moves system. While the simple elimination se-
mantics is a one (re)move system, the imperative logic requires
at least a four moves system. On the indicative side, besides
sentences that give picture fragments for unraveling facts, one
needs also sentences for expressing regularities, since they re-
strict the range of possible present and future situations. On
the imperative side, the idea that imperatives solely act upon
goal gallery seems to be straightforward. Still, if we take im-
peratives to be instructions for changing or sustaining a type of
situation, then change to ϕ means change actual ¬ϕ situation
into ϕ situation, and sustain ϕ situation means do not change
actual ϕ situation into ¬ϕ situation. These double semantic
moves, the asymmetric and symmetric one, seem to be more ac-
curate account of natural language imperative semantics when
compared to act-on-goals-only approach. There is another mo-
tivation for this kind of imperative semantics: in connecting
2 In the system developed here the generated classes are not disjoint.
Rather, the class of states I generated by indicative sentences is a superset
of the class of statesM generated by imperative sentences.
3For imperatives and indicatives it holds that if a text Maϕ;Mb¬ϕ is
consistent, then modal elements Ma and Mb do not belong to the same
mood category.
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imperative logic with belief-desire logic one may characterize
agent motivational state by the imperative the agent accepts
(see Chapter 5). The asymmetric imperative can characterize
the state of desire, since ”anyone...who desires, desires...what is
not present” (Plato, Symposium, 200A-201A) .
Suggestions. If there is a degree of soundness in this im-
perative variant of eliminative semantics, then test sentences as
phenomena visible through eliminative semantic lenses should
become visible if present. It seems that the answer is positive:
suggestion expressing sentences seem to be imperative sentences
in a test-mode. The suggestions are complex test sentences. In
the formal treatment, they test acceptability of certain impera-
tives and they also include a test whether a model belongs to the
category of models generated by application of imperative sen-
tences. The latter test reflects the fact that suggestions in the
typical case propose a relative goal for acceptance or rejection.
2.1 ’Three moves’ language L!•¡ for im-
perative logic
Syntax. If ϕ, ψ are propositions in the standard language LP
of propositional logic, then •ϕ, ¡ϕ, !ϕ are sentences of the lan-
guage L!•¡ of practical update logic. Nothing else is in L!•¡. A
sequence of sentences ϕ1, ...,ϕn in L!•¡ is called a text4.
Semantics. Sentences are interpreted as functions from Σ
to Σ. The set Σ = {hγ,αi | γ ⊆W,α ⊆W} is a family of states
(i.e. model variations or contexts). The set W = PD is the set
of situations i.e. valuations over the finite set D of all propo-
sitional letters in the part of language LP under consideration.
In the class Σ distinguished elements and subclasses are:
• 0 = hW,W i, initial or minimal state
4Bold Greek letters stand for sentences in L!•¡ .
12
• the class of final states F = {hγ,αi | γ = ∅ ∨ α = ∅} in-
cluding absurd state 1 ∈ F defined as 1 = h∅, ∅i.
Sentences.
Preliminary definitions. Truth set of sentence radical ϕ ∈
LP inW : kϕkW = {w∈W | w ² ϕ}. Truth set of sentence radical
ϕ ∈ LP in X ⊆W : kϕkX = kϕkW ∩X
• hγ,αi [¡ϕ] = hkϕkγ , kϕkαi
• hγ,αi [•ϕ] = hγ, kϕkαi
• hγ,αi [!ϕ] = hkϕkγ , k¬ϕkαi
Text. σ [ϕ1; ...;ϕn] = (σ [ϕ1] ...) [ϕn] = σ [ϕ1] ... [ϕn], where
ϕi ∈ L!•¡
The repertoire of semantic actions for imperative
logic. The basic moves are: (1) information update about
’hard facts’ which cannot be changed in any case (determin-
istic rule), (2) information about the current situation where
one believes oneself to be (fact), (3) information about the de-
sired non-actual state (goal and fact). The moves consist in
removing points from the set γ of future and desired situations
or removing points from the set α of situations which are indis-
tinguishable with respect to their actuality.
The semantic impact of a deterministic rule cannot be iden-
tified with the impact of a factual sentence. Deterministic rule
fixes that what cannot be the case neither now or in the future.
Usually it is expressed by conditional if ϕ is the case, then ψ
will be the case. Therefore, sentence-radical of a rule is pro-
jected on both sets of candidate situations. On the other hand,
information on facts is projected on the set α leaving only those
situations which are indistinguishable regarding their actuality.
Instructions to change situation in a certain way is projected
both to the set γ of situations that are indistinguishable with
respect to their desirability and to set α. Imperatives have dou-
ble semantic impact. ”Change to ϕ” thus consists of projection
kϕkγ and k¬ϕkα: it sets a goal and reports on facts. This
combined goal-fact approach seems to justified if one assumes
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a semantic basis for pragmatics. If a speaker suggests a goal
she believes to be impossible or s/he commands that the actual
state is to be brought about, then the logic of suggestions and
commands is violated. When the Imperator is not sure wether
ϕ is the case, s/he should say ”Change to ϕ if ϕ is not the case.”
If one does not choose mixed, goal-and-fact semantics for im-
peratives, then s/he must endorse the idea that an imperative
!ϕ commands two actions: first, an epistemic one consisting in
checking whether ϕ is the case, and the second, conditional one
consisting in seeing to it that ϕ (if ϕ is not the case). On this
approach, but not on ours, a conditional •¬ϕ →!ϕ is identical
with !ϕ.
Semantic notions. Variants of ordinary semantic notions
of eliminative semantics (see page 5).
Acceptance and acceptability A sentence ϕ ∈ L!•¡ is ac-
cepted in a state σ iff σ [ϕ] = σ. A sentence ϕ ∈ L!•¡ is
acceptable in a state σ iff σ [ϕ] /∈ F .
Update-to-test consequence relation
ϕ1; ...;ϕn ²ut ψ iff ∀σ : σ [ϕ1] ... [ϕn] = σ [ϕ1] ... [ϕn] [ψ]
Zero-update-to-test consequence relation
ϕ1; ...;ϕn ²0−ut ψ iff 0 [ϕ1] ... [ϕn] = 0 [ϕ1] ... [ϕn] [ψ]
Consistency and coherence. A sequence of sentences in L!•¡
ϕ1; ...;ϕn is consistent iff ∃σ : σ [ϕ1] ... [ϕn] /∈ F , and co-
herent iff ∃σ /∈F : σ [ϕ1] = ... = σ [ϕn]
Example 4 Goal: Pluto (×) is inside; Fact: Fido (•) is in-
side; Deterministic rule: Pluto will not be inside unless Fido
is outside. What should be done? Goal: Pluto is inside and
Fido is not inside.
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Reduction of uncertainty regarding goals (white area) and
facts (grey area) may lead towards an emergence of a new
relative goal.
2.2 Reduction of uncertainty in the prac-
tical setting
A way of explicating the notion of practical reasoning can be
given in terms of ’reduction of uncertainty’. In theoretical rea-
soning an agent discovers the actual situation (i.e. the situation
believed to be actual) by eliminating its possible descriptions.
Parallel to this popular metaphor of information growth as un-
certainity reduction, practical reasoning may be viewed as re-
duction of uncertainty with respect to facts and goals. In a
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successful case, ’practical uncertainty reduction’ is an informa-
tional process in which determination of the actual situation and
covering rules enables the determination of the minimal, feasible
and permitted change needed for realization of an original goal.
In a typical case reduction of motivational uncertainty evolves
through the sequence: initial state 0
imperative
=⇒ extended motiva-
tional state indicative=⇒ maximal motivational state. In an extended
motivational state some goals are acceptable and not accepted
i.e. they are rejectable (see Definition 8 and Proposition 10).
On the other hand, maximal motivational states are complete
in the sense that for any sentence in the part of language L!•¡
under consideration it holds that the sentence is either accepted
or not acceptable (see Definition 7 and Proposition 4). A max-
imal motivational state is a point of motivational certainty in
so far it has been settled which situation is the actual one and
which situation ought to be brought about. If there is more
than one candidate for the goal situation, it is possible that one
of them could turn out not to be a desired one. The information
that the situation believed to be actual has changed leads to a
final state. Within eliminative approach the notion of satisfac-
tion should be modelled as a ’historical entity’ having a genetic
definition5.
Some technical remarks Any maximal state can be reached
in two steps i.e. by a two sentence text (Proposition 5).
For any text there is a decision procedure which deter-
mines whether given amount of ”information and duties”
leads to maximal state (Proposition 6).
The ’interaction between theoretical and practical reasoning’
is reflected in the possibility that a indicative-sentence update
on a motivational state in which goal ϕ is accepted may lead
towards a state that verifies goal ψ (where ψ is not equivalent
to ϕ). In literature two types of relations between goals have
drawn attention: the relation between a goal and its subgoals,
5The notion of satisfaction will not be discussed here since its requires
additional structure.
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α⊆γ or γ∩α=∅
L◊!•/ 0-accessible states: 
α⊆γ or γ∩α=∅
Final states: γ=∅ or α=∅Final states: γ=∅ or α=∅Motivational states:  γ∩α=∅Motivational states:  γ∩α=∅
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Figure 2 Update paths.
and the relation between an end and its means. Subgoal is
usually understood as having the property of being entailed by
goal: if ϕ is a goal and ψ is its subgoal, then ϕ |= ψ. On the
other hand, ends and means are logically unrelated goals: if ϕ is
an end and ψ is a means to it, then ϕ 2 ψ and ψ 2 ϕ. It seems
that a distinction between original and derived (relative) goal
may be introduced with all reason: on that account subgoals
and means are derived or relative goals.
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3 Prima facie consequence
No adding metaphor. Suppose that a process of elimination
by text T has created context C in which sentence ϕ makes no
change. Shall we say that ϕ is a consequence of T since ϕ adds
(removes) nothing? The answer is positive only provided that
nothing else besides T has been accepted. How can we be sure
that in this process of elimination only sentences from T have
taken part? If all the models from the family are present at the
initial point of elimination, the context created by T will be ’the
largest’. One may call this context a minimal one: its informa-
tional content is the least in the class of contexts that verify
T . Minimal context can be useful in formal semantics if there
is a meaning relation that exists between a sentence and a text
in the minimal context. A meaning relation of that kind seems
to be a ground for the notion of prima facie consequence. The
conclusion that cannot be detached from its grounds must be of
a special kind. For if it is a model eliminating sentence, then it
will hold in any context that verifies premises: if it can not re-
move models from the largest class, it surely will not be able to
remove the models from any of its subclasses. So undetachable
conclusion must be a noneliminative sentence. It seems that
in natural language we encounter such sentences, which ’report
on the gallery condition instead of removing pictures from it’.
They are introspective sentences reporting on a context (state,
model) status.
In next paragraphs we will discuss test-sentences in impera-
tive mood1. They exhibit nonpersistence and in the framework
of eliminative semantics they qualify as plausible candidates for
the role of defeasible conclusion.
Extending language to L♦!•¡. For the purpose of accom-
modating test-sentences we will extend the language.
Syntax. A string ϕ of symbols is a sentence of the language
of L♦!•¡ iff ϕ ∈ L!•¡, or ϕ = ♦• ψ or ϕ = ♦! ψ or ϕ = !♦ ψ,
1An idea similar to the here presented modalities within moods was
hinted by Castañeda for deontic logic: ”[...] statemental modal operators
apply to deontic assertables” p.39.[8]
18
where ψ ∈ LP .
Semantics for test sentences. Distinguished states and
classes of states are: absurd state 1, class of nonfinal motiva-
tional states2 M characterized by α ∩ γ = ∅, and class of final
states F .
• Indicative modalities
— Epistemic possibility:
hγ,αi
h
♦• ϕ)
i
=
½ hγ,αi if hγ,αi [•ϕ] /∈ F
1 otherwise
• Imperative modalities
— Buletic possibility
hγ,αi
h
♦! ϕ)
i
=
½ hγ,αi if hγ,αi [!ϕ)] /∈ F
1 otherwise
• — Pro(h)airetic possibility
hγ,αi
h
!♦ ϕ
i
=



hγ,αi if



hγ,αi ∈M and
hγ,αi [!ϕ] /∈ F and
hγ,αi [!¬ϕ)] ∈ F
1 otherwise
Uncertainty provides a natural habitat for sentences such as
”It might be the case that ϕ”, ”It might be good to bring it
about that ϕ”, ”It seems that ϕ should be done”. Sentences of
such a kind are not intended to change the state of mind, rather
they are put forward for consideration. In the typical case, they
express some cognitive and volitive options which have not been
eliminated yet, although they can be eliminated later.
In the formal sense the state/model σ corresponding to a
state of mind not completely determined is not a maximal state
2Motivational states are generated if and only only an imperative sen-
tence has been applied (see Proposition 16).
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and therefore, it can be further refined by additional sentences3.
That state of mind can be changed only with respect to relative
goals and uncertain facts. In that sense some accepted sentence
can be rejected later (see Propositions 8, 9 and Lemma 7).
3.1 Nonpersistent sentences and preferred
model
It has been noted by several authors in philosophy of action and
in philosophical logic that the notion of validity in practical logic
is not classical one. Usually nonmonotonicity is recognized as
a specific feature of consequence relation in practical logic. Ex-
pression ’prima facie’ is used either to indicate that additional
premises may defeat the conclusion (Wallace [33]) or that con-
clusion can not be detached from its premises (Davidson [14]).
The idea that there can be some kind of valid inference with
defeasible conclusion can be modeled as a premises-conclusion
meaning relation holding in the minimal model of the premises.
In the set of states ΣT for a sequence of sentences T there is
a minimal state σminT such that for any state σ0 ∈ ΣT ,σ0 6= σ
there is a sentence accepted in σ0 and not accepted in σminT .
Assume that ”prima facie consequence” means ”(relation of)
conclusion being acceptable in the light of premises T but pos-
sibly rejectable by an extended text a ⊕ T , where ’⊕’ denotes
operation of arbitrary positioning ”. Since σminT = 0 [T ], it
follows that prima facie consequence relation can be explicated
by notions of rejectable sentence (p. 19) and a consequence re-
lation defined over the minimal state (p. 14).The informational
content of the minimal state in the class of models for of the
text T is the smallest content (see Propositions 8 and 9).
Reconciliation. The conflicting intuitions on the valid
forms of imperative-indicative inferences seem to be reconcil-
3A state is accessible if there is an update path leading to it. Our
attention is restricted here only to 0-accessible states; other states have a
different genealogy pertaining to a richer language.
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able to an degree. Typically, if a schema is taken to be invalid
by an author, and valid by another, then the premises are in-
complete (in the sense of Proposition 6) while the conclusion is
a rejectable sentence accepted in the minimal state.
Example 5 (Practical syllogism) Disagreement with respect
to validity in imperative and belief-desire logic.
Formulations of the allegedly valid principle:
(1) S genuinely wants p to be the case for its own
sake. (2) Only if S does X will p be the case. (1) and
(2) constitute prima facie grounds for (C) S should
do X. (Wallace [33])
If X believes [knows] that (p implies q), then that
X intends p implies that X intends q. (Castañeda [9])
One wants to attain x. Unless y is done, x will
not be attained. Therefore y must be done. (Von
Wright [37])
Systems with explicit criteria4:
Valid?
Segerb erg [27] (!δp ∧ [δp] q)→!δq no
Belnap , Perloff , Horty [4][23] ([α dstit : p] ∧¤(p→ q))→ [α stit : q] no
Cross [13] (4(p) ∧ (p→ q))→ 4q no
Chellas [11] (!p ∧¡ (p→ q))→!q yes
Kenny [24] (Fiat(p) ∧Est(p→ q)→ Fiat(q) no
Fulda [18] ((p→ s) ∧ (p→ q))→ (q → s) no
L♦!•¡ !p;¡(p→ q) ²ut!q no
L♦!•¡ !p;¡(p→ q) ²0−ut !♦ q yes.
Different results arise from different semantics. From our
standpoint, the premises are incomplete in the sense that they
4Main features of formal semantic systems are given in the remark on
the page??.
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do not necessarily lead to the maximal state (in this case addi-
tion of •¬q would suffice) thus giving grounds for acceptance of
defeasible conclusion !♦ q (which can be ruled out by •¬q).
Example 6
Valid?
Segerb erg [27] (!δ (p ∧ q) ∧ p)→!δq no
Belnap , Perloff , Horty [4 ][23 ] ([α dstit : p ∧ q] ∧ p))→ [α dstit : q] no
Cross [13] (4(p ∧ q) ∧ p))→ 4q no
Cross [13] (4(p ∧ q) ∧ ⊕p))→ 4q yes
Chellas [11] (! (p ∧ q) ∧ p)→!q yes
Kenny [24] (Fiat(p ∧ q) ∧Est(p)→ Fiat(q) yes
Fulda [18] (((p ∧ q)→ s) ∧ p)→ (q → s) yes
L♦!•¡ ! (p ∧ q) ; •p ²ut!q yes
L♦!•¡ ! (p ∧ q) ; •p ²0−ut !♦ q yes
In this example the premises determine the maximal state.
Still the validity declarations do not converge. It could be useful
to point out semantic peculiarities which give rise to negative
results.
Context independency. The authority commands ’Close
the door and open the window’ in a situation which is believed
both by the authority and the addressee as the situation where
the door is closed (and each of them knows what the other be-
lieves). It is redundant then to issue the further command ’Open
the window’. If it is nevertheless issued, it will not change or add
anything to the initial command. In the sequence ’(i) Close the
door and open the window! (ii) The door is closed. Therefore,
(iii) open the window!’ the last sentence (iii) does not seem to
be contextually independent. It seems natural to have alongside
with the contextually independent reading5, i.e. ’Do anything
to bring it about that the window is open!’ (as suggested in
Segerberg [27]), a contextual dependent one ’Make the minimal
5Counterexample is an action hw, vi such that w ∈ kpk and v ∈ k¬p ∧ qk
which does not belong to a command set: kp ∧ qk ∈ Γw but hw, vi /∈
{hw, yi : y ∈ kp ∧ qk}, therefore, it is possible that kqk /∈ Γw.
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change of actual state that will bring about that the window
is open’. In contextual dependent reading the imperative (iii)
does not change the initial goal. Similar arguments apply to
STIT logic where the possibility that some agent does not have
a choice to open the window makes this subgoal inference form
invalid.
Relative notion of satisfaction. One translation for ’!(p∧
q), •p Therefore, !q’ in MLD (Cross [13]) is a valid schema
(4(p ∧ q) ∧⊕p)→ 4p
’4’ reads ’desire in the sense of incompatible goal-belief discrep-
ancy’ and ’⊕p’ reads ’agent is satisfied that p’. The implicit idea
that an agent is satisfied by realization of a subgoal seems coun-
terintuitive. One would rather say that agent wants to preserve
a subgoal if it happens that the actual situation belongs to the
same situation type. The other reading
(4(p ∧ q) ∧ p)→ 4p
gives an invalid inference. Motivational extension can be con-
ceived of as a process in which the goal ”remains fixed’ while
”subgoals change”, but the assertion that every realization of a
subgoal leads to the state of satisfaction (Cross, 1997) does not
seem acceptable. The motivational force of a desire is exhausted
by the realization of its content, and only that final point of mo-
tivation extension is a state of satisfaction, not an intermediate
motivational state in which an agent desires to sustain some-
thing.
Remark 1 Main semantic features of several systems.
[13] k!ϕk (w, t) = 1 kϕk (w
0, t) = 1
for every w0 such that Rt (w,w0)
[23] M,m/h ² [α dstit : ϕ]
∀h0 : h0 ∈ Choicemα (h)→M,m/h0 ² ϕ
and
∃h00 : h00 ∈ H(m) ∧M,m/h00 2 ϕ
[13] VM,w(4ϕ) = > ∀w
0 ¡wR1w0 → VM,w0(ϕ) = >¢ and
∀w00
¡
wR2w
00 → VM,w00(ϕ) = ⊥
¢
[27] Γ ²x
requires
!δϕ {hx, yi : y ∈ kϕk} ∈ Γx
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4 Negation of imperatives and no-
tion of change
The task of dynamic semantics is to provide a connection be-
tween a structure that verifies a sentence and operations that
produce verifying structural variation. In the simple update
system an imperative is verified by a pair hγ,αi of disjoint sets,
γ ∩ α = ∅ and an asymmetric action is connected with im-
peratives in order to generate required structure. To update a
structure with a sentence means to produce a minimal modifica-
tion of the structure needed for the verification of the sentence.
Following that line of thought, negation of a sentence can be
understood as an operation that will prevent any successful1
modification by that sentence. In that sense, negation changes
a structure in a way that makes accepting of negated sentence
impossible. There are different ways of making an imperative
unacceptable. According to the semantics for imperatives as
change directives the imperative !ϕ is not acceptable in any state
hγ,αi such that γ∩kϕk = ∅ or α−kϕk = ∅. Since fulfillment of
one condition suffices, indicative sentence •ϕ could be regarded
as a variant of a dynamic negation (see
2¬!ϕ below). In general
dynamic negation in a eliminative update system (’forward look-
ing system’) can be characterized by the following proposition
.
Proposition 1 ∀σ : σ [¬ϕ] [ϕ] ∈ F .
It could be interesting to examine several sentential instruc-
tions that will satisfy the proposition.
• 1. hγ,αi
h
1¬!ϕ
i
= hk¬ϕkγ ,αi ”Don’t change to ϕ what-
ever the actual situation may be.”
2. hγ,αi
h
2¬!ϕ
i
= hγ, kϕkαi = hγ,αi [•ϕ] ”It is the case
that ϕ.”
1 ’Successful’ means ’not landing into a final state’.
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3. hγ,αi
h
3¬!ϕ
i
= hk¬ϕkγ , kϕkαi = hγ,αi [!¬ϕ] ”Change
to ¬ϕ.”
4. hγ,αi
h
4¬!ϕ
i
= hk¬ϕkγ , k¬ϕkαi (i) ”Preserve ¬ϕ”,
”Do not change ¬ϕ”, ”Do not change to ϕ”, ”Sustain
¬ϕ”
5. hγ,αi
h
5¬!ϕ
i
= hkϕkγ , kϕkαi (i) ”Preserve ϕ”, ”Do
not change ϕ”, ”Do not change to ¬ϕ”
We will assume that negation of an imperative is an imper-
ative too, ruling out
2¬!ϕ. The opposition !ϕ vs. 3¬!ϕ(or !¬ϕ) is
not a good candidate for the role of negated change instruction
if it is intuitively acceptable that the ’negated change’ amounts
to ’no change’. The opposition !ϕ vs.
5¬!ϕ is not a good candi-
date either in so far both commands share the same goal con-
tent. The remaining cases
1¬!ϕ and 4¬!ϕ give good candidates.
The ’one-sided goal negation’ has special attractiveness since,
together with •-type sentences, it can make all states σ ∈ Σ
reachable. On the other hand, within the proposed semantics
for imperatives as change instructions negation
1¬ turns out to
be indeterminate between a variant of a conditional imperative
hγ,αi
h
1.1¬ !ϕ
i
=
½ hk¬ϕkγ ,αi if hγ,αi [•ϕ] = hγ,αi
hγ,αi otherwise
and a command without informational content
hγ,αi
h
1.2¬ !ϕ
i
= hk¬ϕkγ ,αi
We opt for
4¬!ϕ as a plausible candidate for negated imperative
since
4¬!ϕ and !ϕ impose different imperative alternatives for
the same actual situation. Still, the identical symmetric seman-
tics given to the negations ¬4 and ¬5and regularity expressing
indicatives (¡¬ϕ and ¡ϕ, respectively) shows that the formal
structure must be refined since it is obvious that e.g. ¡¬ϕ and
4¬!ϕ do not mean the same.
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Figure 1 Negated and affirmed imperative: alternatives for the
same situation.
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4.1 Extended language L¬!♦!•¡ and refined
models
In order to accommodate negated imperatives, more refined
models will be introduced (i.e. ordered triples of sets of val-
uations). The resulting system will be a ’four moves system’.
Semantics. Family of models
Σ∗ = {hγ,α,πi | γ ⊆ π,α ⊆ π,π ⊆W} .
• 0 = hW,W,W i, initial or minimal model
• the class of final models F = {hγ,α,πi | γ = ∅ ∨ α = ∅}
including absurd model 1 ∈ F defined as 1 = h∅, ∅, ∅i
• the class of nonfinal models S characterized by γ 6= π
• the class of nonfinal modelsM ⊂ S characterized by α ∩
γ = ∅
4.1.0.0.1 Sentences
Definition 1 (Truth set) kϕkX = X ∩ kϕkW
Basic sentences.
• necessary ϕ
— hγ,α,πi [¡ϕ] = hkϕkγ , kϕkα , kϕkπi
• actually ϕ
— hγ,α,πi [•ϕ] = hγ, kϕkα ,πi
• change to ϕ
— hγ,α,πi [!ϕ] = hkϕkγ , k¬ϕkα ,πi
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• sustain ¬ϕ (do not change to ϕ)
— hγ,α,πi
h
¬! ϕ
i
=
½ hk¬ϕkγ , k¬ϕkα ,πi if k¬ϕkγ 6= π
1 otherwise
Defined, complex sentences.
• possibly ϕ
— σ
h
•♦ ϕ
i
=
½
σ if σ [¡ϕ] 6= 1
1 otherwise
• not necessary ϕ (possibly not ϕ)
— σ
h
¬¡ ϕ
i
= σ
h
•♦ ¬ϕ
i
• not actually ϕ (actually not ϕ)
— σ
£ ¬• ϕ)¤ = σ [•¬ϕ)]
• might ϕ
— σ
h
♦• ϕ
i
=
½
σ if σ [•ϕ] /∈ F
1 otherwise
• might be good to produce ϕ
— σ
h
♦! ϕ
i
=
½
σ if σ [!ϕ] /∈ F
1 otherwise
• might be good to sustain ϕ
— σ
h
♦¬! ¬ϕ
i
=
½
σ if ¬! ¬ϕ /∈ F
1 otherwise
• maybe ϕ should be brought about
— σ
h
!♦ ϕ)
i
=



σ if



σ ∈M and
σ [!ϕ] /∈ F and
σ [!¬ϕ] ∈ F
1 otherwise
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• maybe ϕ should be preserved
— σ
h
¬!♦ ¬ϕ)
i
=



σ if



(σ ∈M or σ ∈ S) and
σ
h
¬! ¬ϕ
i
/∈ F and
σ
h
¬! ϕ
i
∈ F
1 otherwise
Remark 2 We call ’!0, ’ ¬! ’, ’ ♦! ’, ’ ♦¬! ’, ’ !♦ ’, ’ !¬♦ ’ modal
elements of imperative mood, and ’•’, ’ ¬• ’, ’ ♦• ’, ’¡’, ’ •♦ ’
modal elements of indicative mood.
?Change to A is inside?
? Actu
ally B
is ins
ide?
?Do not change to B is not inside?
?Change to
A and B are
inside?




AB







A




B
B
A A B
A B A
B
B
A
A B
B
A
A B A
B
B
A A B
4.1.1 Explanation of semantic moves: ¬!♦ and !♦
The sentences having form (i) ’Maybe ϕ should be brought
about’ and (ii) ’Maybe ϕ should be sustained’ could be regarded
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as kind of imperatives in so far as their sentence radical denotes
the type of an acceptable (yet defeasible) goal situation. Using
sentences of the kind one usually express practical suggestions2.
The sentence forms (i) and (ii) seem to be a complex test func-
tions. The Speaker, having incomplete knowledge of Hearer’s
reasons and supposing an inclination for a suggested goal on
the Hearer’s side, proposes a relative goal for Hearer. A not rig-
orous extraction of semantic parts of suggestion sentences could
give us the following decomposition. For (i): on Speaker’s opin-
ion there is something x Hearer already wants + ϕ is related to
that x so that Hearer does not want to have ¬ϕ and Hearer may
want to have ϕ. For (ii): there is something x Hearer already
wants it+ ϕ is related to that x so that Hearer does not want to
lose ϕ and Hearer may want to keep ϕ.
Proposition 2 ∀σ : σ [!ϕ] = σ → σ [!¬ϕ] ∈ F
Proposition 3 ∀σ : σ
h
¬! ϕ
i
= σ → σ
h
¬! ¬ϕ
i
∈ F
Assume that there are only 2 permitted moves in giving the
semantics for complex sentences: 1. use basic sentences, 2. use
distinguished elements and subclasses of the family of models
Σ∗.
We want to delineate two classes of states, SC for suggested
changes and SS for suggested preservations.
(i) SC =
n
hγ,α,πi | γ ⊆ kϕkW ∧ α− kϕkW 6= ∅
o
and
(ii) SS =
n
hγ,α,πi | γ ⊆ kϕkW ∧ α ∩ kϕkW 6= ∅
o
(i) ’Maybe ϕ should be brought about’
’+’ stands for ’All worlds are...’
’+/-’ stands for ’Some worlds are and some worlds are not...’
’-’ stands for ’No world is...’
’@’ marks states in which produce ¬ϕ can not be accepted3
2suggest v. 2. to propose (a plan or theory) for acceptance or rejection
(The Oxford Dictionary for Modern English)
3All goal situations are ϕ-situations or no actual situation is a ϕ-
situation.
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’*’ marks states in which produce ϕ can be accepted
’M’ marks states which are necessarily M-type states
double lines mark the classes of models that satisfy the con-
ditions for !♦ ϕ being accepted
Goal situation Actual situation σ [!¬ϕ] ∈ F σ [!ϕ] /∈ F
ϕ− worlds ϕ−worlds
+ + @
+ +/- M @ *
+ - M @ *
+/- - @ *
- - @
(ii) ’Maybe ϕ should be preserved’
’+’ stands for ’All worlds are...’
’+/-’ stands for ’Some worlds are and some worlds are not...’
’-’ stands for ’No world is...’
’#’ marks states in which sustain ¬ϕ can not be accepted4
’$’ marks states in which sustain ϕ can be accepted
’M’ marks states which are necessarilyM-type states
’S’ marks states which are usually S-type states
double lines mark the classes of models that usually satisfy
the conditions for ¬!♦ ¬ϕ being accepted
Goal
situation
Actual
situation
σ
h
¬! ϕ
i
∈ F σ
h
¬! ¬ϕ
i
/∈ F
ϕ−worlds ϕ− worlds
+ + S* # $
+ +/- M # $
+ - M #
+/- + # $
- + #
Remark 3 See appendix for a way to prove whether a class of
states is a subset ofM-type states (an example covering second
row in the table above is given in Proposition 17).
4All goal situations are ϕ-situations or all actual situations are ϕ-
situations.
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?Change to A is inside?
?Actual
ly B
is insid
e?
?Change to B is not inside?
?Change to A is 
inside and B is not 
inside?




AB







A



B
B
A AB
AB A
B
B
A
AB A
B
B
A AB
?Maybe Bshould 
stay inside?
A
B
B
A
Nonperisistent sentence
is defeasible.
Dotted arrow denotes the nullifying of nonpersistent sentence
by additional sentence. Also note that a nonpersistent
imperative sentence may be accepted even when suggested
goal is not a relative one.
4.1.2 Conditional imperative
Conditional imperative anchors a type of a goal situation to a
particular kind of actual situations. The simplest specimen is
•ψ →!ϕ
The simplest solution for the semantics of a conditional im-
perative within here proposed modelling would be to treat it as
simple test function.
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• σ [•ψ →!ϕ] =
½
σ [!ϕ] if σ [•ψ] = σ
σ otherwise
We do not want semantics in which conditional imperative
may be ”forgotten” if the antecedent is not true (desired be-
havior is depicted in the picture below). On the contrary, the
semantics of the conditional imperative should restrict the pos-
sible evolution of a model even when the indicative antecedent
is not true. In order to meet that demand, the semantics of a
conditional imperative must somehow encapsulate the semantic
impact of different sequences of sentences in order to restrict the
space of evolution paths.
0
•ψ→!ϕ
•¬ϕ
•ψ
¬!¬ψ
!ϕ
•¬ψ !ϕ
¬!ϕ
N
O
N
FIN
A
L STA
TES
ϕ,ψ≠T
ϕ,ψ≠F
…
…
…
…
…
•¬ϕ
!ϕ
…
Part of evolution tree for conditional imperatives.
Unfortunately the proposed semantics of ordered triples of
sets of valuations can not fullfil that demand5. The solution
requires different modelling like the one given in the example 7.
5 If 0 [•ψ →!ϕ; •ψ; •¬ϕ] = hγ,α,πi, then hγ,α,πi [!ϕ] = hγ,α,πi
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Example 7
Σ =
©hP,Ri | R ⊆ P × P,P ⊆W,W = 2 set of propositional letters ª
hP,Ri [!ϕ] = hP, {(w, v) ∈ R | w ² ϕ ∧ v 2 ϕ}i
hP,Ri [•ϕ] = hP, {(w, v) ∈ R | v ² ϕ}i
hP,Ri
h
¬! ϕ
i
= hP, {(w, v) ∈ R | w 2 ϕ ∧ v 2 ϕ}i
Operation d : hPi, Rii d hPj , Rji = hPi ∪ Pj , Ri ∪Rji
The desired behavior is obtained by
σ [•ψ →!ϕ] =
½
σ [!ϕ] if σ [•ψ] = σ
σ [•ψ] [!ϕ] dσ [•¬ψ] otherwise
should hold. The latter requires γ ⊆ kϕkW . On the other hand, if
0 [•ψ →!ϕ; •¬ψ; !¬ϕ] = hγ0,α0,πi, then hγ0,α0,πi /∈ F should hold. The
latter requires that γ0∩ k¬ϕkW 6= ∅. Since indicative texts •ψ; •¬ϕ and
•¬ψ cannot eliminate points from goal set, it follows that 0 [•ϕ→!ψ] =
hγ00,α00,πi should satisfy contradictory conditions i.e. γ00 ⊆ kϕkW and γ00∩
k¬ϕkW 6= ∅.
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5 Semantics of propositional atti-
tudes reports
We use term ’propositional attitude report’ to denote a class
of sentences in which a psychological intentional verb is used.
The term ’psychological -intentional verb’ will be used in a in-
formal sense and therefore we introduce it by way of examples:
’to desire’, ’to think’, ’to believe’, ’to hope’ are examples, and
non-examples are: ’to touch’, ’to taste’, ’to suffer’. We adopt
the tradition which treats propositional attitude reports as sen-
tences (that can be rephrased as) having a verb of the kind
followed by an embedded sentence describing a state of affairs
that is the object of the attitude denoted by the verb , e.g. ”She
desires that her art would have an emotional impact”.
Two-part anatomy and direction of fit. In analyz-
ing intentional states, i.e. propositional attitudes, and sentence
moods authors usually distinguish two components.
mental states
Husserl noesis noema
Russell attitude proposition
Anscombe direction of fit content
sentences
Hare tropic phrastic
Stenius modal element sentence radical
Kenny mood indicator descriptive content
This psychological - linguistic parallelism in anatomy is fur-
ther emphasized by another similarity. Imperatives and desires
are such that ’the world must fit with’ them, while declaratives
and beliefs are such that they ’must fit the world’. This twofold
parallelism motivates an idea of establishing connection between
mental states and sentences.
Dynamic semantics. It is not necessary to identify the
changing models of dynamic semantics with the internal states
of an computing system (be it a machine or a pre-linguistic
child). We can treat dynamic semantics as just another kind
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of model theory which uses variations of Kripkean, Tarskian
and Kripkean-Tarskian models to account for some semantic
phenomena, like order sensitivity, non-classical consequence re-
lation and nonpersistent sentences. Nevertheless, the idea of
connecting models and intentional states seems to be natural
in that framework: models are states of (an ideal) system and
model evolution paths are histories of such states.
Representation free approach. By accepting the idea
that the model changes are triggered by sentences we are not
forced to adopt a variant of representationalistic metaphor ac-
cording to which the sentences are components in internal func-
tioning of a system. The metaphor was prominent in history
of ideas (e.g. inner voice, cultural imperative, categorical im-
perative, language of thought, to name a few), but it is weak
in number of points which have been discussed in the litera-
ture. Instead we adopt a non-realist position: by using propo-
sitional attitude predicates we adopt an interpretational stance
(intentional stance, Dennett [16]) in which we exploit inferential
relations between mood designated sentences (modified version
of Davidson’s measurement theoretic approach to the semantics
of propositional attitude reports [15]). The position advocated
here differs from the Davidson’s position in so far as we take
entities to be mood designated sentences and not mood free
propositions.
Just as in measuring weight we need a collection
of entities which have structure in which we can re-
flect the relations between weighty objects, so in at-
tributing states of belief (and other propositional at-
titudes) we need a collection of entities related in the
ways that will allow us to keep track of the relevant
properties and relations among the various psycho-
logical states. ( Davidson, What is present to the
mind in [15] p. 60.)
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5.1 Characterization of intentional states
The approach to the propositional attitude report semantics,
which we want to explore here, relies on two basic theoretical
assumptions. Intentional states may be (i) theoretically identi-
fied with models of some sort and (ii) characterized by semantic
relations between models and mood designated sentences. On
this approach, the informational content of sentence type
[mental predicate P] ([agent a] , [proposition ϕ])
is identical with the informational content of the sentence ’there
is a model σ such that agent’s state is identical with it and σ
belongs to the class of models satisfying update condition with
respect to a mood M designated sentence(s) Mϕ’.
agent a is in a state σ s.t. σ ∈ {σ | ...update condition...}
(i) a wants to change to ϕ σ [!ϕ] = σ
(ii) a wants to sustain ϕ σ
h
¬! ¬ϕ
i
= σ
(iii) a believes that ϕ is the case σ [•ϕ] = σ
(iv) a believes that ϕ might be the case σ
h
♦• ϕ
i
= σ
(v) a believes that ϕ is necessary the case σ [¡ϕ] = σ
(vi) a opposes that ¬ϕ will be produced σ
h
!♦ ϕ
i
= σ
(vii) a opposes that ¬ϕ will be sustained σ
h
¬!♦ ¬ϕ
i
= σ
The states verifying suggested changes or preservations of
the situation type seem to be useful for modelling of a weaker
sense of desire.
[...] we may now distinguish what we might call vari-
ous levels of want or desire, beginning at the lowest level:
(i) He prefers A to not-A. (ii) He opposes not-A. (iii)
He favors A. (iv) He favors A and opposes not-A. [...].
The terms ’want’ and ’desire’, in their ordinary use, may
be used to refer to any of these various levels of want
37
or desire. They are generally used in such a way that
the objects of want and desire are restricted to objects
that are future [...]and to objects such that the persons
who wants or desires them does not believe them to be
impossible. (Chisholm [12] 623)
Remark 4 Cross conceptualizes state (i) as a state of ’desire in
the sense of incompatible goal-belief discrepancy’ and state (ii)
as a state of satisfaction. Our position is quite different. See
Section 3.1 for a discussion. Note that on Chisholmian reading
’opposing that ¬ϕ’ means ’desiring that ϕ in a weaker sense’.
Semantic holism and rationality assumption. The
’semantic holism’ involved in use of mental vocabulary is ex-
plained by the assumption that propositional attitudes charac-
terize mental states of an agent. Propositional attitude reports
do not single out an intentional state, rather they characterize
a class of states by a necessary condition. The use of men-
tal vocabulary imposes ’rationality assumption’ on descriptum
[14][16].
Any effort at increasing the accuracy and power of a
theory of behavior forces us to bring more and more of
the whole system of the agent’s beliefs and motives di-
rectly into account. But in inferring this system from the
evidence, we necessarily impose conditions of coherence,
rationality, and consistency. (Davidson [14] p. 231.)
One of the ways the rationality assumption is introduced is
reflected in coherence condition: only coherent text can charac-
terize a non-final mental state.
Example 8 The text ”It might be raining...It is not raining” is
dynamically or sequentially consistent. Still it cannot be used for
characterization of an intentional state due to its incoherence.
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5.2 Validity of rationalizations
Founded and founding systems. The studies in the logical
form of intentional explanations and in meaning relations be-
tween sentences in different logical moods may be given a unified
treatment by distinguishing founded and founding system. The
founding ’inferential relations’ are meaning relations between
sentences in imperative and declarative logical moods. The va-
lidity of rationalizations formulated within intentional language
depends on the validity of corresponding inference formulated
in the language using logical moods.
5.2.1 Two modes of validity for rationalizations
Rationalization and rationality. First we introduce a crite-
rion of validity for intentional explanations (also called: ratio-
nalizations or reason explanations. A rationalization is valid iff
it exemplifies a norm of rationality.
Two modes of rationality. We make a distinction be-
tween two modes of rationality. Horizontal rationality is inter-
nal relation between intentional states. Vertical rationality is
a external relation between an intentional state and the real
world (see [38]). Two modes of rationality correspond to the
two Davidsonian principles of interpretation. Principle of Co-
herence corresponds to the horizontal mode, Principle of Corre-
spondence to the vertical mode.
The process of separating meaning and opinion in-
vokes two key principles which must be applicable if a
speaker is interpretable: the Principle of Coherence and
the Principle of Correspondence. The Principle of Co-
herence prompts the interpreter to discover a degree of
logical consistency in the thought of the speaker; the prin-
ciple of Correspondence prompts the interpreter to take
the speaker to be responding to the same features of the
world that he (the interpreter) would be responding un-
der similar circumstances. Both principles can be (and
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have been) called the principles of charity: one principle
endows the speaker with the modicum of logic, the other
endows him with a degree of what interpreter takes to
be true belief about the world. Successful interpretation
necessarily invests the person interpreted with the basic
rationality. It follows from the nature of correct interpre-
tation that an interpersonal standard of consistency and
correspondence to the facts applies to both the speaker
and the speaker’s interpreter, to their utterances and to
their beliefs. (Davidson [15] p.211)
Horizontal mode.
Definition 2 The sequence
P 1(a,ϕ1), ..., P
n(a,ϕn), therefore, (should) P
n+1(a,ϕn+1)
exemplifies a prima facie norm of horizontal rationality iff
M1(ϕ1); ...;M
n(ϕn) |=0−ut Mn+1(ϕn+1)
and
0
£
M1(ϕ1); ...;M
n(ϕn)
¤
/∈ F
where M i is a modal element corresponding to psychological
predicate P i .
Definition 3 The sequence
P 1(a,ϕ1), ..., P
n(a,ϕn), therefore, (should) P
n+1(a,ϕn+1)
exemplifies a norm of horizontal rationality iff
M1(ϕ1); ...;M
n(ϕn) ²ut Mn+1(ϕn+1)
and
M1(ϕ1); ...;M
n(ϕn) is coherent
where M i is a modal element corresponding to psychological
predicate P i .
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Example 9 The statement ’The desire that p and the belief
that p only if q can rationalize the desire that q, but cannot
rationalize the belief that q’ should be conceived as abbreviation
for ’The desire that p and the belief that p only if q rationalize
the desire that q only if !p;¡ (p→ q) ²!q, but cannot rationalize
the belief that q since !p;¡ (p→ q) 2 •q’.
The definitions given above are simplified in order to point
out the connection between belief-desire logic and imperative
logic. In order to make the definitions applicable one should ex-
tract sentence radical and consequently treat intentional-psychological
predicates generously. For example, the intentional predicate in
sentence ”a believes that it might be snowing’ is ’believes that
it might be the case’. The other option in which complete sen-
tences rather then their radicals are taken to be the ’objects’ of
a propositional attitude seems more natural.
Example 10 ’a believes that it is necessary that it is cold if it
snows. She believes that it might be snowing. Therefore, she
(should believe) believes that it might be cold’ is not formalized
as ’B(a,¡(s → c)), B(a, ♦• s) ² B(a, ♦• c)’, but rather as
’B¡(a, s→ c), B♦•(a, s) ² B♦•(a, c)’.
Vertical mode
The definition of validity in vertical mode requires additional
notions. The intentional states are rational if connected to the
real world in appropriate way. It is not enough for a belief to
be justified by another beliefs, both its grounds and the belief
itself should be true. The same goes for desires: if one desires
the impossible, she should revise her beliefs. For example, while
it may be horizontally rational to want to open the window
believed to be closed, it is always vertically irrational to want
to open it if it is already open.
Definition 4 w is a model of the real situation . Rw is the set
of objectively (really) possible continuations of the real situation,
Rw = {v | v is really possible at w} .
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Definition 5 Theoretical model hγ,α,πi of an intentional state
is (possibly α-incomplete) veridical state iff
∀v : v ∈ γ → v ∈ Rw
and
w ∈ α
Definition 6 The sequence
’P 1(a,ϕ1), ..., P
n(a,ϕn), therefore, (should) P
n+1(a,ϕn+1)’
exemplifies a norm of vertical rationality iff (i) it exemplifies a
norm of horizontal rationality and (ii) every σ /∈ F such that
σ
£
M1(ϕ1); ...;M
n(ϕn)
¤
= σ is a veridical model (where M i is
a modal element corresponding to psychological predicate P i).
5.3 Application: anatomy of excuse
Making an excuse shows how two kinds of semantic relations
are being used in a language game. In the typical case, Excuser
shows that his intentional action would not have been preformed
if his state of mind was a veridical one. In virtue of having a
horizontal and vertical semantic dimensions, the language of
intentionality makes it possible for a horizontally rational in-
tentional state to be vertically irrational.
At a dull party, Husband wanted to make people laugh by
telling a joke. Unfortunately, his telling a joke spoiled Wife’s
good mood. Husband apologizes: ”I did not know that the joke
would spoil your mood.” In that way he shows that his desire to
tell a joke was horizontally prima facie rational, but irrational
in the vertical sense.
Full blown excuse:
a) realized horizontal part:Wants!(Husband, The people
are laughing), Believes¡( Husband, If Husband tells that joke,
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the people will laugh), 1, therefore, prima facieWants!♦(Husband,
Husband tells that joke),
b) failed vertical part: Wants!(Husband, The people are
laughing), Believes¡(Husband, If Husband tells that joke, the
people will laugh), Wants¬!¬(Husband,Wife is in a good mood),
Believes¡(Husband, If Husband tells that joke, Wife will not be
in a good mood), therefore, Wants!( Husband, Husband does not
tell the joke).
1 ’Wants¬!¬(Husband, Wife is in a good mood)’reads ’Husband wants to
sustain Wife’s good mood’.
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Initial state, 0-state. L=People are laughing, J=Husband tells
the joke, M=Wife is in a good mood. 1={L, J,M}, 2={L, J},
3={L,M}, 4={L}, 5={J,M}, 6={J}, 7={M}, 8={}.
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Defeasible conclusion holding in a non-veridical state
(situation 1 is not really possible situation, 1/∈Rw).
45
Vertically waranted conclusion: ’Don’t tell that joke!’.
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6 Appendix1
Remark 5 Test sentences will be left out of consideration in
the lemmata and propositions regarding properties of accessible
states. Nevertheless, the results apply to test sentences in virtue
of the fact that their application may generate only one change,
namely change to the absurd state, 1. The results are given for
L!•¡ and L♦!•¡, still most of them apply to L¬!♦!•¡ mutatis
mutandis.
Definition 7 hγ,αi is maximal state iff |γ| = |α| = 1 and γ ∩
α = ∅.
Proposition 4 σ is maximal state iff σ ∈ M and ∀ϕ ∈ LP
: σ
h
♦! ϕ
i
= σ → σ [!ϕ] = σ
Proof. Define function nf : 2W → LP which delivers a
disjunctive normal form for a set of worlds X as nf (X) =W
w∈X
¡¡V
l∈w l
¢
∧
¡V
l /∈w ¬l
¢¢
. We have to prove that |γ| =
|α| = 1 and γ ∩ α = ∅, iff hγ,αi ∈ M and ∀ϕ ∈ LP :
hγ,αi
h
♦! ϕ
i
= σ → hγ,αi [!ϕ] = hγ,αi. Going from left
to right, suppose for reductio that hγ,αi
h
♦! ϕ
i
= hγ,αi ∧
hγ,αi [!ϕ] 6= hγ,αi. Then, either ∃w∃v : w ∈ γ ∧ v ∈ γ ∧ w /∈
kϕkW ∧ v /∈ kϕkW or ∃w∃v : w ∈ α ∧ v ∈ α ∧ w /∈ kϕkW ∧
v ∈ kϕkW . Therefore, either |γ| 6= 1 or |α| 6= 1. Contradiction.
Going from right to left, suppose for reductio that |γ| 6= 1 or
|α| 6= 1 or γ ∩ α 6= ∅. If |γ| = 0 or |α| = 0, then hγ,αi ∈ F .
Contradiction. If |γ| > 1, then
∃w : w ∈ γ ∧ γ − {w} 6= ∅ ∧
∧ hγ,αi
h
♦! nf({w})
i
= hγ,αi ∧ hγ,αi [!nf({w})] = h{w} ,αi .
Therefore, some acceptable sentence is not accepted. Contra-
diction. If |α| > 1 then
∃w : w ∈ α ∧ α− {w} 6= ∅ ∧
1Appendix by Berislav Zˇarni´c and Damir Vukicˇevi´c
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∧ hγ,αi
h
♦! nf({w} ∪ γ)
i
= hγ,αi ∧
∧ hγ,αi [!nf({w} ∪ γ)] = hγ,α− {w}i .
Contradiction. If γ ∩ α 6= 0, then hγ,αi /∈M. Contradiction.
Definition 8 σ is extended motivational state iff ∃ϕ ∈ LP
: σ
h
♦! ϕ
i
= σ ∧ σ [!ϕ] 6= σ
Proposition 5 Any maximal state can be reached in two steps.
Use function nf : 2W → LP which delivers a disjunctive nor-
mal form for a set of worldsX i.e. nf (X) =
W
w∈X
¡¡V
l∈w l
¢
∧
¡V
l/∈w ¬l
¢¢
.
Let hγ0,α0i be a maximal state and γ0 ⊆ γ, α0 ⊆ α. Text
•nf (α0) ; !nf (γ0) is an instance of a complete two-sentence text
since hγ,αi [•nf (α0)] [!nf (γ0)] = hγ0,α0i
Proposition 6 It is decidable whether a given text can reach a
maximal state.
For each sentence from a text s1; s2; ...; sn extract sentence
radical or its negation, and form a conjunction according to the
following recipe:
Φn =
^
i∈{1,...,n}[(si=!ϕ)∨(si=¡ϕ)]
ϕ
and
Ψn =
^
i∈{1,...,n}[(si=•ψ)∨(si=¡ψ)∨(si=!¬ψ)]
ψ.
Text s1; s2; ...; sn may reach a maximal state iff¯¯¯
kΦnkW
¯¯¯
= 1 ∧
¯¯¯
kΨnkW
¯¯¯
= 1 ∧ kΦnkW 6= kΨnkW
Definition 9 0/L♦!•¡-accessibility relation R0/L♦!•¡ ⊆ Σ
L♦!•¡×
ΣL♦!•¡ :
R0/L♦!•¡ =
R0/L♦!•¡ = =
½­
σ,σ0
® | ∃s1...∃sn∃sn+1...∃sm : s1, ..., sm ∈ L♦!•¡∧∧0 [s1; ...; sn] = σ ∧ σ [sn+1; ...; sm] = σ0
¾
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Lemma 7 Let hγ,αi = 0 [T ]. Then for any model hγ0,α0i such
that hγ0,α0i [T ] = hγ0,α0i and hγ0,α0i 6= hγ,αi it holds that
γ0 ⊂ γ or α0 ⊂ α.
Proof. Let T = s1; s2; ...; sn. Use the recipe from Propo-
sition 6 to obtain Φn and Ψn for text T . Given that 0 [T ] =D
kΦnkW , kΨnkW
E
, γ0 ⊆ kΦnkW , α0 ⊆ kΨnkW , lemma follows.
Proposition 8 Each model for a text T is accessible from its
minimal model.
Proof. Let hγ0,α0i be a nonfinal, 0/L♦!•¡-accessible model for
a text T and σminT = hγ,αi = 0 [T ], then
hγ,αi £¡nf ¡γ0 ∪ α0¢¤ £•nf ¡α0¢¤ = ­γ0,α0® .
Text¡nf (γ0 ∪ α0) ; •nf (α0) is an instance of a text that reaches
hγ0,α0i. Therefore, ­σminT , hγ0,α0i® ∈ R0/L♦!•¡ .
Proposition 9 For each nonminimal model hγ0,α0i for a text
T there is a text T ∗ which is not accepted in the minimal model
hγ,αi = 0 [T ].
Proof. Denote by kTkΣ0/L♦!•¡ a set of nonfinal states in which
T is accepted. If γ0 ⊂ γ or α0 ⊂ α, then 0 [T ] [¡nf (γ0 ∪ α0)] [•nf (α0)] 6=
0 [T ]. Therefore, T ;¡nf (γ0 ∪ α0) ; •nf (α0) = T ∗
Proposition 10 A sentence ψ , accepted in a model hγ,αi, is
rejectable iff: (i) ψ = ♦• ϕ and kϕkα 6= ∅ ∧ k¬ϕkα 6= ∅, or (ii)
ψ = ♦! ϕ and kϕkγ 6= ∅∧k¬ϕkα 6= ∅∧(k¬ϕkγ 6= ∅ ∨ kϕkα 6= ∅),
or (iii) ψ = !♦ ϕ and γ ∩ α = ∅ ∧ kϕkγ 6= ∅ ∧ k¬ϕkα 6=
∅ ∧ ((k¬ϕkγ = ∅ ∧ kϕkα 6= ∅) ∨ (k¬ϕkγ 6= ∅ ∧ kϕkα = ∅)).
Proof. Direct calculation.
Lemma 11 (Elimination lemma) For any γ, α, γ0, α0 such
that hhγ,αi , hγ0,α0ii ∈ R0/L♦!•¡ : α0 ⊆ α and γ0 ⊆ γ. If hγ,αi 6=hγ0,α0i, then γ0 ⊂ γ or α0 ⊂ α.
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Proof. Trivial.
Lemma 12 Let T = s1; ...; sn, where si = ¡ϕ or si = •ϕ ,
hγ,αi [T ] = hγ0,α0i, α ⊆ γ. Then α0 ⊆ γ0.
Proof. Induction.
Lemma 13 Let hγ,αi [T ] = hγ0,α0i,γ∩α = ∅. Then γ0∩α0 = ∅.
Proof. Use Lemma 11
Lemma 14 Let hγ,αi [s1; ...; sn] = hγ0,α0i and at least one sen-
tence si is !ϕ for some ϕ ∈ LP . Then γ0 ∩ α0 = ∅.
Proof. It is obvious that for any γ and α that kϕkγ∩k¬ϕkα =
∅ and that property is preserved by Lemma 13.
Theorem 15 The state σ = hγ,αi is 0/L♦!•¡-accessible if and
only if γ ∩ α = ∅ or α ⊆ γ.
Proof. Going from right to left. First, assume γ ∩ α = ∅.
Then
0 [¡ (nf (α ∪ γ))] [! (nf (γ))] = hγ,αi .
Second, assume α ⊆ γ. Then
0 [¡ (nf (γ))] [• (nf (α))] = hγ,αi .
Going from left to right, we shall prove that a state is not
0/L♦!•¡-accessible if γ ∩ α 6= ∅ and α * γ . Let α * γ and
0 [s1; ...; sn] = hγ,αi . It implies that there is a sentence si such
that si 6= ¡ϕ and si 6= •ϕ. Since there are only three types
of basic sentences, then it must be the case that si =!ϕ. But
Lemma 14 and the fact γ ∩ α 6= ∅ imply that there is no such
sentence in s1; ...; sn. Contradiction.
Proposition 16 hγ,αi ∈ M iff ∃ϕ : ϕ ∈ LP ∧ hγ,αi [!ϕ] =
hγ,αi
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Proof. Going from left to right. For reductio assume ¬∃ϕ :
ϕ ∈ LP ∧ hγ,αi [!ϕ] = hγ,αi. But, hγ,αi [!nf(γ)] = hγ,αi .
Contradiction. The other direction trivially follows from kϕkγ∩
k¬ϕkα = ∅.
Proposition 17 Let γ ⊆ kϕkW and α ∩ kϕkW 6= ∅ and α *
kϕkW . Then hγ,αi ∈M.
Proof. For reductio suppose γ ∩ α 6= ∅. Use 15 to obtain a
contradiction.
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